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Security Challenges

Assessing the Threat of
Maritime Terrorism:
Issues for the Asia-Pacific Region
Sam Bateman
This article provides a critical assessment of the contemporary threat of maritime terrorism in
the Asia-Pacific region. It addresses the operational dimensions of the threat to ships and port
infrastructure, and considers the effectiveness of the international and regional measures that
have been introduced in recent years to deal with this threat. Based on a proposition that that
there has been rather too much emphasis on highly remote and speculative “doomsday”
scenarios, the article supports the need for balance and equity in addressing the risks of
maritime terrorism. It identifies types of terrorist attack that might be assessed as more
credible, as well as some that might be considered less credible.

Maritime Terrorism
The need to counter the threat of maritime terrorism has led to fundamental
changes in the international maritime security environment, and the maritime
strategies of most countries, especially major seaborne trading nations. The
maritime terrorist threats within the scope of this paper are possible attacks
on a port facility or a ship at sea or in a port within the Asia-Pacific region. It
does not address supply chain issues or the use of the maritime
transportation system to carry terrorists or their materials, possibly through
the use of shipping containers - in the worst case scenario, a weapon of
mass destruction (WMD). The paper focuses on operational considerations
related directly to ships and ports. Measures such as the Container Security
Initiative (CSI), the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT),
and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to secure the supply chain or
prevent the proliferation of WMD are beyond the scope of this paper.
Seaborne trade is of great importance in the Asia-Pacific region. This is a
consequence of both the maritime nature of the region and the fact that the
booming economies of the modern world are all within the region. Seaborne
trade gains additional importance in the Western Pacific and East Asia
because of the archipelagic nature of this part of the world. Except in parts
of China and the Malay Peninsula, there is no developed land transport
infrastructure on the East Asian mainland, and foreign trade perforce must
be carried by sea or air. East Asian ports are mainly linked by sea and intraregional seaborne trade is of great significance.
Furthermore, the
archipelagic countries of Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia all have large
domestic commercial shipping fleets essential for their domestic trade.
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Shipping and seaborne trade are considered by many analysts to be
vulnerable to terrorist attack. This assessment is based on the quantities of
cargo involved, international shipping’s diverse and large international labour
force, difficulties of enforcement both in port and at sea, and the poor
regulatory environment of the international shipping industry with low levels
of accountability, complicated chains of ownership, and a high incidence of
fraudulent documentation.1
Terrorists could potentially exploit these
weaknesses to use sea transport for their evil purposes, or to launch an
attack on shipping and port infrastructure that could cause massive
economic disruption. Within the region, one writer has claimed that
2
Southeast Asia is now the centre of global maritime terrorism.
The need to counter the threat of maritime terrorism has led to fundamental
changes in the international maritime security environment. The new
counter-measures have imposed large additional costs on the global
transport system and have required significant effort from both government
and industry. However so far, the maritime terrorist threat has had no
significant impact on the volume or pattern of international seaborne trade.
There has been stronger than expected economic growth in Asia, and this
would not have been any different without the terrorist attacks on the World
Center in New York on 11 September 2001 (9/11).

Maritime Security
Events of 9/11 and perceptions of a terrorist threat to shipping have forced a
reappraisal of the concept of maritime security. The concept has a
traditional meaning for navies and defence forces with their role of protecting
the nation and its national interests against threats primarily of a military
nature. However, the concept of maritime security has expanded following
9/11. It is still about protecting national security but instead of overt threats
from military forces, there is a new emphasis on asymmetric threats,
including both maritime terrorism and piracy. This focus is apparent in the
work of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) directed towards
enhancing the security of international shipping and seaborne trade.
The new approach to maritime security is based on a range of security- and
military based measures. The IMO, primarily through the International Ship
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and related measures, has built up
the physical and personal security of ships and ports, while the US has led
the militarized approaches evident in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)
championed by the Bush Administration.

1

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Security in Maritime
Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact, Paris: OECD, July 2003, p. 5
2
Rommel C. Banlaoi, ‘Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia – the Abu Sayyaf Threat’, Naval
War College Review, Autumn 2005, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 63-80.
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The militarizing of the terrorist threat is demonstrated by the War in Iraq, the
operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the tacit support by the
US for Israel in its fight against Hezbollah. All of these operations have a
significant maritime dimension, and the US Navy is developing a new
Maritime Strategy, which will recognise the GWOT as the Navy’s top priority,
along with defending the US Homeland against terrorist attack.3 The new
Maritime Strategy will have a strong emphasis on international cooperation
effectively encouraging other countries to increase their military spending to
meet the threat of maritime terrorism. This approach does not recognise
that the fight against terrorism cannot be won by military force alone but
requires a concerted effort based on diplomacy, intelligence, education, and
4
Increased military spending involves high
winning community support.
opportunity costs through its diversion of resources from social, economic
and educational measures that might alleviate root causes of terrorism.
There is also a close relationship between maritime safety and maritime
security. While a distinction between the two meanings is apparent in
5
English, in some languages they are almost synonymous. Safety and
security are not mutually exclusive. Even the IMO has changed its motto
from “safer ships, cleaner oceans” to “safe, secure and efficient shipping on
clean oceans” to reflect this new emphasis. The operational measures to
provide maritime security, including the prevention of all forms of illegal
activity at sea, also provide additional safety at sea.
At a national level, these developments have brought more agencies into
play with maritime security. While navies see their business as protecting
the nation and national interests at sea, most navies are not responsible for
the security of port facilities or ships in port. These activities are the
responsibilities of the marine police or coast guard. Similar considerations
apply to policing at sea. Just as on land where most countries apply a clear
separation between the civil police and the military, a similar distinction can
6
exist at sea between the roles of a navy and those of a coast guard. This
distinction is becoming even more apparent in the post 9/11 environment. In
Australia, for example, maritime security is now a shared responsibility
between Defence, Coastwatch, and the Office of Transport Security, as well
3

Christopher P. Cava, ‘U.S. Navy Chief calls for New ‘Maritime Strategy’’, Defense News
online, June 15, 2006, and Sam Bateman, ‘Navies of the World Unite! Will the New U.S.
Maritime Strategy Work?’, IDSS Commentary 79/2006, Singapore: Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies (IDSS), 11 August 2006
4
Tom Quiggin, ‘Time for a Different Approach in the War on Terrorism?’, IDSS Commentary
82/2006, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), 15 August 2006.
5
Maximo Quibranza Mejia Jr, ‘Defining maritime violence and maritime security’ in Proshanto K.
Mukherjee, Maximo Q. Meija Jr, Gotthard M. Gauci (eds), Maritime violence and other security
issues at sea, Proceedings of the Symposium on Maritime Violence and other Security Issues
at Sea, August 2002, World Maritime University, Malmo, Sweden, p. 28.
6
This paper uses the term “coast guard” to refer to the para-military policing forces at sea,
although they may have different names in different countries e.g. the Malaysian Maritime
Enforcement Agency or the Korean National Maritime Police.
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as other agencies at the State and Federal levels.7 This wider definition of
maritime security puts a premium on inter-agency coordination, both at the
national and regional levels, and the lack of this coordination is often a
barrier to effective maritime security in the region.

“New” Threats
Piracy and maritime terrorism have become the “new” threats to maritime
security in the Asia-Pacific region. While acts of piracy and armed robbery
against ships have a long history in Asian waters, particularly in Southeast
Asia, international interest in the piracy threat has been much higher in
recent years. Several factors explain this. First, the incidence of piracy and
armed robbery against ships has led to assessments of higher risks of
terrorist attack, and actions to counter piracy are seen as also reducing the
risks of terrorist attack.8 Secondly, Northeast Asian countries, particularly
China, Japan and South Korea, are highly dependent on energy supplies
from the Middle East and have become concerned about the security of
tankers carrying these supplies, as well as other shipping, passing through
“choke points” in Southeast Asia. Thirdly, the United States with its heavy
involvement in the Middle East is concerned about strategic mobility
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans with most US Navy ships and
submarines in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean being deployed from
bases in the Pacific. Lastly, the major regional sea powers, as well as the
United States, all have strategic motivation to establish a presence in
Southeast Asia and may use the threats of piracy and terrorism to justify that
presence.
Whether or not all this increased attention is justified is open to question.
9
There was a marked fall in the number of piracy attacks in 2005, and the
types of attack that are carried out are not those that warrant the direct
operational involvement of non-littoral countries in providing maritime
security in Southeast Asian waters. Most attacks are on vessels in port or at
anchor off a port. These attacks are usually of a minor nature and will only
be countered by more effective policing by port authorities, and not by
international action although some assistance with building the capacity of
the port authorities would be useful. Furthermore, attacks on vessels
7

The complex arrangements for comprehensive maritime security in Australia are discussed in
Bateman, S., Bergin, A., Tsamenyi, M. and Woolner, D., ‘Integrated maritime enforcement and
compliance in Australia’ in Rothwell, D. and VanderZwaag, D. (eds), Towards Principled
Oceans Governance - Australian and Canadian approaches and challenges (Abingdon,
Routledge, 2006), pp. 119-142
8
See for example, Gal Luft and Anne Korin, ‘Terrorism Goes to Sea’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83,
No.6, September/October 2004, pp. 61-71. This paper, however, was later roundly criticised in a
letter from an established expert on piracy to the Editor of Foreign Affairs its “uncritically
repeating myths, half truths and unsupportable assertions of an alleged nexus of piracy and
terrorism”. Charles Dragonette, ‘Lost at Sea’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005.
9
International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Annual
Report for the Period 1 January- 31 December 2005, 31 January 2006.
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underway are mainly on smaller, more vulnerable vessels in local trades.
“Mainline” container vessels and large tankers on international voyages
through the Malacca and Singapore Straits between Europe or the Middle
East and East Asia are not attacked unless they slow down, anchor or
stop.10 Yet these are the vessels that are the focus of international interest
in, and offers of assistance with the security of shipping using the Straits.
The potential for cooperation between pirates and terrorists has probably
11
Piracy and maritime terrorism might involve a similar
been overstated.
modus operandi by the attackers but a distinction exists between the two
acts with piracy being conducted for private ends while terrorism has political
motives. In assessments of the risk of maritime terrorism, pirates have been
seen as having skills and expertise that might be attractive to a terrorist
group, but these are not so specialised that they are not readily available.
There are many former naval personnel, fishermen and commercial
seafarers in the region with knowledge and experience that could be used by
a terrorist group. A distinction must also be drawn between terrorists using
piracy and armed robbery against vessels to raise funds on the one hand,
and the direct targeting of a ship or port facility as an act of terrorism on the
other. Both Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in northern Sumatra and the Abu
Sayyaf Group in the southern Philippines have carried out attacks, including
kidnappings for ransom, to raise funds.

Assessing the Threat
There have been relatively few confirmed acts of maritime terrorism.
Passenger ships and ferries have been preferred targets with the sinking of
Superferry 14 in February 2004 near Manila in the Philippines being the
most serious act of maritime terrorism so far in terms of loss of life with 116
people killed.12 However, the attacks on the USS Cole in Aden in October
2000 and on the French tanker Limburg off Yemen in 2004 usually attract
most attention in writings on maritime terrorism because they were initiated
by al-Qaeda and occurred in the context of 9/11. Numerous maritime
terrorist attacks by the “Sea Tigers” of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) on both merchant ships and Sri Lankan warships are also often cited

10

Sam Bateman, Catherine Zara Raymond and Joshua Ho, Safety and Security in the Malacca
and Singapore Straits – An Agenda for Action, Singapore, Institute of Defence and Strategic
Studies (IDSS), May 2006,
11
Adam Young and Mark J. Valencia, ‘Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia:
Rectitude and Utility’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.25, No.2, August 2003, pp. 269-283.
12
Other attacks on ferries in Southeast Asia include the February 2000 bombing of the
Philippine ferry Our Lady Mediatrix, which killed forty people; and the December 2001 bombing
of the Indonesian ferry Kailifornia, which killed ten. John F. Bradford, ‘The Growing Prospects
for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia’, Naval War College Review, Summer
2005, Vol.58, No.3, p. 67.
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as examples of what might be possible, including the assessment that alQaeda has benefited from the techniques of the LTTE.13
It is not too difficult to conjure up “doomsday” scenarios for a maritime
terrorist attack. A ship carrying a highly dangerous cargo could be hijacked
and used as a floating bomb to destroy a port and cause large loss of human
14
life, or a shipping container or a ship itself could be used to import a WMD.
However, these are low probability, high consequence scenarios that can
lead to some lack of balance in decision-making both by Governments and
the business sector. Assessments of the threat of maritime terrorism must
be rational and represent a reasonable balance between the likelihood of an
attack occurring and the costs of providing adequate security against such
an attack. The assessments depend on a multitude of factors, especially the
capabilities and intentions of prospective maritime terrorists, the vulnerability
of particular targets, and the consequences of an attack should one occur.

Terrorist Capabilities
The main maritime terrorist threat in Southeast Asia is usually seen as
coming from al-Qaeda and its associated groups, particularly Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). These groups have
training camps in the southern Philippines where they train together and
15
Members of these groups routinely move between
share expertise.
Sabah, Indonesian Borneo and these camps by speedboat, local craft and
ferries. The ASG in the Philippines has already shown that it can attack
ships having claimed responsibility for the Superferry 14 attack, and more
recently, has been blamed for the bomb attack on the ferry Dona Ramona in
16
August 2005 as the ship was about to depart from the port of Zamboanga.
These attacks show that ferries, and potentially cruise liners, are vulnerable
to attack. With passenger ships and ferries, it is not so much the bomb that
does the damage but rather the fire and panic that might follow an explosion
with so many people in a relatively confined area. In March 2004, Philippine
military sources were quoted as saying that the ASG was training with JI to
prepare for possible seaborne and underwater attacks outside the
17
Philippines.
In relative terms, maritime targets may be less attractive than land or air
targets. Ships at sea are difficult targets, and an attack on port infrastructure
may have rather less impact than an attack on a major building or facility
13

Rohan Gunaratna ‘Terrorist threat to shipping is ‘imminent and growing’’ Lloyd’s List,
Wednesday 29 September 2004.
Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade – Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004, pp. 112133.
15
Rommel Banlaoi, ‘Romulo: RP won’t be frontline of terror attack’, Philippine Daily Inquirer,
August 13, 2005, p. .A1.
16
‘Ferry Blast Injures 30 in Southern Philippines’, The New York Times online, August 28, 2005.
17
‘Terrorists train for Seaborne Attacks’, JoyoNews, Joyo@aol.com, Friday March 18, 2005.
14
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(such as a mass transportation system) that has both high economic and
iconic value. Unless a ship itself was used as a bomb or as a means of
introducing a WMD, a maritime terrorist attack may not cause large loss of
life. Even then, a terrorist group would require very specialised skills and
capabilities before it could even have a modicum of confidence that the
mission might be a success. From a terrorist viewpoint, hijacking a ship to
use as a floating bomb would have a lower probability of a successful
outcome than hijacking an aircraft for a 9/11 type mission or placing a bomb
on a crowded train. The destruction of a port facility might have significant
economic impact but might not loom large in the public consciousness. The
potential list of targets for a terrorist is limitless but maritime targets may not
be high on the list. The preferred targets for terrorists are likely to remain on
land where, as shown by the attacks on mass urban transport in London and
Madrid, success is more readily assured.

Threats to Ships
Ships are more vulnerable in port, or in the approaches to a port, than when
they are at sea where they might gain considerable protection from their size
and speed. Most large, modern merchant ships travel at speeds in excess
of fourteen knots and it is both difficult and dangerous for small craft to
attempt to approach them at this speed. Smaller ships and vessels
alongside or at anchor figure prominently in the statistics on acts of piracy
and armed attacks on ships collected by the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB). In port, ships face threats from the landside, small boats and
underwater swimmers.
The attack on USS Cole demonstrated this
vulnerability. This has led to the USN and other Western navies much
18
greater attention to the force protection of their ships during port calls.
The ships that are most vulnerable to terrorist attack are those carrying
hazardous or dangerous cargoes that could turn the ship into a bomb,
passenger ferries and cruise liners, as well as naval vessels. Smaller
tankers with cargoes of lighter more volatile crude oils, as well as refined
products such as gasoline, kerosene, and diesoline, are potentially a greater
risk than large ships carrying heavy crude oil which is difficult to ignite.
While most attention has focused on the larger tankers and liquid natural gas
(LNG) carriers, smaller vessels such as product tankers, Liquid petroleum
gas (LPG) carriers and chemical tankers are more prominent in the piracy
19
These vessels
statistics and may be more vulnerable to terrorist attack.
are generally slower than larger vessels, and have smaller crews and lower
freeboards. But generally, it remains the case that gas carriers and tankers
are more vulnerable when loading or unloading than at sea. Thus the
18

For example, each USN ship has an integrated tactical team (SITT) that protects the ship
against a variety of threats while in port. Paul Mullen and Jon Bartee, ‘Put a SWAT Team on
Every Ship’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2002, pp. 30-33,
19
Bateman, Raymond and Ho, Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, p. 234.
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problem is more one of terminal security rather than of ship security and of
providing security for ships entering port.

Threats to Ports
There are at least 1,600 ports around the world used by ships trading
internationally. Port security, and maritime security more generally, are very
different to aviation security. The public generally understands and accepts
the need for aviation security, but this may not be so with maritime security.
The security of ports and ships must consider all environments: land, air, sea
surface and sub-surface. Airports have defined perimeters and usually
some form of “buffer zone” between an airport and other activities. Access
to an airport is more easily controlled than to a port. Airline passengers
expect to be screened with their baggage and airline and airport workers can
be closely monitored. In comparison, ports may not have a clearly defined
perimeter, even on the landside where they might be located in or adjacent
to heavily populated urban areas. Ports vary greatly with regard to their
physical attributes while airports are all basically similar. Each port is
different by virtue of its geography, topography, surroundings and
population.20 Ports by their very nature are vulnerable. They are busy areas
with access both by land and sea. While separate facilities may not be large
in area, the geographical extent of a port may be very wide.
Waterside security will generally be more difficult and costly than landside
security. While tight physical security might be possible on the entry points
to a port from the landside, it is extremely difficult to secure a port and the
ships in it from attacks launched from the seaward, particularly if there is a
high level of small craft activity in the port. Singapore has recognised this
vulnerability with the introduction of the Harbour Craft Transponder System
(HARTS) that requires all watercraft using its ports to be fitted with a
transponder that identifies the craft to monitors onshore. Singapore also
uses Accompanying Sea Security Teams (ASSeT) teams to board and
protect selected ships deemed to pose a greater risk to the port prior to their
21
entering harbour or while they are transiting through Singapore’s waters.
In the US, the Department of Homeland Security has been criticised for
spending millions of dollars on port security without sufficiently focusing on
22
those that are most vulnerable. There would appear to be a need now to
modify this approach somewhat by concentrating on key vulnerabilities,
including the security of the full supply chain, and the identification of ships,
port facilities and cargoes that pose the greater risks. For example, a petrochemical port facility located in a built-up area is clearly much more
20

Chris Mayer, ‘Access and identity are key points’, Lloyd’s List, Thursday September 30, 2005.
‘Singapore Navy to escort passing merchant ships to stop terrorism’, Khaleej Times online, 28
February 2005.
22
Eric Lipton, ‘Audit Faults U.S. for Its Spending on Port Defence’, The New York Times,
February 20, 2005.
21
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vulnerable than a bulk ore or grain loading facility in a remote area. There is
also the consideration that an oil refinery or a LNG terminal is a more
feasible target for a terrorist group than using a ship as a “floating bomb”.
Probably too much emphasis has been given to “worst case” scenarios.

Attack Scenarios
It is instructive to identify potential types of attack that terrorists might make
against maritime targets. Possible attack scenarios are grouped below
according to the ones deemed less credible and those considered more
credible. The focus of these scenarios is on threats to ships and port
infrastructure emanating from the sea. The groupings below are based on
judgments relating to the capabilities of known terrorist groups, the ease with
which particular types of attack might be launched, and the probability of a
successful outcome for the terrorists.

LESS CREDIBLE SCENARIOS

•

Ship sunk to block the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. This is a
popular attack scenario among some academics and sections of the
media but in reality, this scenario must be assessed as less credible,
23
if not even as impossible. There are several reasons for this. First
is the width of the Straits. Even at the most narrow point of the
traffic separation scheme (TSS) off One Fathom Bank, the channel
is still 0.6 nautical miles (or about 1,000 metres) wide. Thus more
than one large vessel would have to be sunk in the correct position
to effectively block this side of the TSS and even then, it would be a
simple matter of traffic management to temporarily route deep
draught vessels on the other side of the TSS, and vessels of lesser
draught could be routed outside of the TSS. The second reason
concerns the difficulties of hijacking a large vessel and managing to
sink it in an optimum position. This would be an extremely
demanding task even for highly experienced seafarers working with
the assistance of tugs. An associated scenario of attacking a large
tanker in a narrow part of the TSS, and causing a fire and explosion
onboard so that a large burning oil slick was created is marginally
24
more credible.

•

Ship with hazardous or dangerous cargo used as “floating bomb”.
This is another popular scenario among many commentators but it is
also assessed as less credible. The types of ship that are often
considered in this scenario are the larger tankers and LNG carriers
although consideration should also be given to vessels such as

23

Catherine Zara Raymond, ‘Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Potential Scenarios’,
Terrorism Monitor, Vol.14, Issue 7, April 6, 2006, p. 2.
24
Neela Bannerjee and Keith Bradsher, ‘A Vulnerable Time to be Moving Oil by Sea’, The New
York Times online, 19 October 2002.
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chemical tankers and ships with volatile cargoes (e.g. ammonium
nitrate). Again there would be problems with successfully hijacking
such a vessel and then navigating it into a position where maximum
damage might result from an explosion onboard. More importantly
however, even the most technically competent terrorists could not be
confident that an attack of this nature would succeed. Missile
attacks on tankers during the “tanker war” of the 1980s25 showed
how difficult it is to ignite a fire on a tanker. Similarly expert opinion
suggests how difficult it would be to cause an LNG carrier to
26
explode. A smaller tanker, LPG carrier, or chemical tanker with a
volatile substance onboard may be a better prospect from a terrorist
27
view point, although the extent of damage caused will be less than
that from an attack on a larger vessel. Smaller vessels might be
more easily hijacked than a larger ship, and with their smaller crews,
it might even be possible to hide the fact from port authorities that
the vessel had been hijacked and was being operated by a terrorist
crew.

•

Underwater swimmer attack on ship or port facility. There have
been reports of Al Qaeda and ASG groups developing skills in
underwater diving with a view to developing a capability to attack a
28
However, the skills and capabilities required
ship or port facility.
for a successful attack are quite sophisticated and in relative terms,
may not be worth investment by terrorists. However, warships,
particularly in a port where the waterfront might be less secure,
could be vulnerable to this type of attack.

MORE CREDIBLE SCENARIOS

•

Bomb attack on cruise liner or passenger ferry. While maritime
security experts generally believe that passenger vessels do not
make good targets because they have so many people onboard and
are not easy to board, nevertheless they are vulnerable to terrorist
attack by placing bombs onboard. This has been demonstrated by
several attacks on passenger ferries in the Philippine and
Indonesian archipelagoes in recent years, including that on the
Superferry 14. The problem is not so much the actual explosion but
the fire and panic that invariably follow. The large loss of life on the
Superferry 14 was not caused by the bomb but by poor fire fighting
and evacuation procedures.

•

“Choke point” blocked by sea mines. This scenario is the one that
might cause the highest level of economic disruption possibly

25

Nicholas Tracy, Attack on Maritime Trade, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991, pp. 224 -230,
Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade, p. 43.
27
Bateman, Raymond and Ho, Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, p. 24.
28
‘Terrorists train for Seaborne Attacks’, JoyoNews, Joyo@aol.com, Friday March 18, 2005.
26
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without even any direct damage being caused. The mining of a ship
in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, the sighting of a mine, or even
just a declaration that mines had been dropped in the Straits could
lead to the re-routing of most shipping traffic away from the Straits.
During the “tanker war” of the 1980s, the laying of mines was
arguably more successful in disrupting shipping traffic than the use
of anti-ship missiles.29
In comparison with other scenarios
discussed in this section, this scenario might seem a low cost option
for a terrorist group. The waters of the Straits are shallow and ideal
for mining by either floating mines or mines placed on the sea
bottom. This scenario would require a multinational response and
this has been recognised by the attention given by the Western
Pacific Naval Symposium to mine counter-measure exercises,
30
including in waters off Singapore.

•

Suicide attack by small craft. Following the suicide small boat
attacks on the tanker Limburg and the USS Cole, as well as
attempted attacks on other US warships, speedboats may be
31
“emerging as the weapon of choice” of maritime terrorists. While
these small craft offer advantages in terms of speed, stealth and
surprise, there also has to be some qualifications as to where such
attacks are likely. The Limburg and Cole attacks both occurred in
potentially “unfriendly waters” in areas where terrorist groups are
known to exist. This type of attack would be less likely in more
secure “friendly waters”, where it would be difficult for the terrorists
to establish a launching area for the attack.

Measures to Counter the Threat
The global solutions to problems of maritime security have been pitched at
several levels, including the physical security of ships and ports, operational
cooperation at sea, the tracking of vessels, the integrity of container cargo,
and enhancing seafarer identity documentation. They include the new
measures by the IMO, particularly the ISPS Code, other amendments to the
1974 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, such as the mandatory
fitting of ship-borne Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), and planned
amendments to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts

29

Tracy, Attack on Maritime Trade, p. 229.
The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) is a consortium of 18 Western Pacific navies
and 4 observer navies. In June 2001, Singapore hosted the first WPNS mine countermeasures
and diving exercises involving 16 countries, 15 ships and 1,500 personnel. Sea Power Centre –
Australia, ‘The Western Pacific Naval Symposium’, Semaphore, Issue 5, March 2006 (available
on the website at <www.navy.gov.au/spc/>).
31
Captain James Pelkofski USN, ‘Before the Storm: Al Qaeda’s Coming Maritime Campaign’,
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 131 No.12, December 2005, p. 22,
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against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) and its Protocol
covering offshore facilities.32

ISPS CODE
The ISPS Code has been a great success. It has had benefits going well
beyond the greater security of ships and port facilities that are required to
conform to the Code. These benefits include greater awareness of security
throughout maritime industry, and the reduction of other forms of maritime
crime, including cargo fraud and cargo pilfering. Giving an officer a specific
responsibility for managing the security of a ship also helps increase security
awareness onboard and reduces the overall vulnerability of the ship.
Notwithstanding the benefits, there are residual problems with the Code’s
effectiveness. It applies only to the so-called “SOLAS ships” i.e. commercial
ships over 500 gross tonnage employed on international voyages. Unless
33
extended by national legislation, it does not apply to fishing vessels, ships
under 500 gross tonnage, or to ships employed only in the domestic trade.
The number of vessels to which the ISPS code does not apply is particularly
large in the Asia-Pacific region where there are large fishing fleets, many
smaller trading vessels, and big domestic commercial fleets, particularly in
34
China, Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines.
The ISPS Code imposes significant additional costs on ship-owners,
35
including possibly having to employ extra crew. The OECD estimated that
the initial burden on ship operators to be at least US$1,279 million and
US$730 million per year thereafter, primarily for additional management staff
36
and security-related equipment. There may be some irony here in that the
international shipping market is buoyant at present, and the market may be
absorbing the costs of the new maritime security measures. A “crunch” may
well come with the next slump in global shipping.
Lastly, and despite some rhetoric to the contrary, the ISPS Code, like other
instruments of international law, cannot be enforced effectively. The IMO
can monitor compliance but ultimately it depends on individual countries
effectively implementing the Code. Flag states have to ensure compliance
32

A new Protocol to the SUA Convention has been adopted by the IMO. It includes new
offences and expanded provisions on ship-boarding. New provisions allow flag states to
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state.
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of ships flying their flag, port states have to manage implementation of the
Code in their ports and port facilities, and seafarer supplying countries, such
as Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines, have to have the bureaucracy
in place to implement new seafarer identity documentation requirements.

SUA CONVENTION
There are about a dozen international conventions dealing with the threat of
terrorism but only the SUA Convention and its Protocol relate to terrorism at
sea. The purpose of this Convention was to close the gap created by the
limited definition of piracy already mentioned. These limitations were
brought to light by the Achille Lauro incident in 1985. This was not an act of
piracy because the terrorists, who seized the ship, were traveling as
37
The SUA Convention extends coastal
passengers onboard the vessel.
State enforcement jurisdiction beyond the territorial limits, and in particular
circumstances, allows exercise of such jurisdiction in an adjacent State’s
territorial sea. The fact that some Southeast Asian countries have still to
ratify the SUA Convention is probably due to some sensitivity to extraterritorial aspects of the Convention.
An IMO Diplomatic Conference in October 2005 adopted new Protocols to
the SUA Convention and its related protocol on Fixed Platforms. These
provide an international treaty framework for combating and prosecuting
individuals who use a ship as a weapon or means of committing a terrorist
attack, or transport by ship terrorists or cargo intended for use in connection
38
A mechanism is also
with weapons of mass destruction programs.
provided to facilitate the boarding in international waters of vessels
suspected of engaging in these activities. These expanded provisions of the
SUA Convention through the introduction of this Protocol are unlikely to
make the Convention any more attractive to those countries, which so far
have chosen not to ratify it.

TRACKING SHIPS
In an ideal world, ships would move around the world like civil aircraft, being
passed from one system of traffic control to another. With initiatives
promoted by the US and now under consideration by the IMO for the Long
Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) of vessels, a system may
eventually emerge for commercial ships above a certain size and making
use of AIS data. The US intends to develop a system that will integrate
current and future surveillance and tracking resources to identify and track
37
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the world’s 121,000 merchant ships of more than 300 tons.39 It will use a
data base similar to that used for tracking Soviet submarines during the Cold
War. However, many other vessels using the world’s oceans remain outside
its scope. This inability to monitor the movement of fishing vessels, as well
as cruising yachts and other private vessels, remains a major gap in
international arrangements for maritime security.
Even with current LRIT plans, there are still unresolved issues. It is by no
means certain, for example, that a coastal state has a right to identify and
track ships exercising the freedom of navigation either through its exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas, and not intending to proceed to a
port or an anchorage located within the territory of that coastal state.40 As
well as tracking at sea, an effective international system should also include
standardised reporting of shipping arrivals and departures but this might
arouse both security and commercial sensitivities. And again, there will be
issues with enforcing the system. For example, while the ISPS Code
requires that ships be fitted with AIS transponders, many ships may be
turning the transponders off when at sea. If queried on this, it is all too easy
say that the equipment was malfunctioning.

Conclusions
The maritime transportation industry has been greatly affected by the threat
of maritime terrorism. It now has a vastly different regulatory environment to
the one that prevailed prior to 9/11. However, there are still grounds for
reservations about the credibility of the terrorist threat to shipping and the
cost-benefits of the new counter-measures. Despite assertions about the
risks and outcomes of a catastrophic maritime terrorist attack, the maritime
terrorist incidents, which have occurred, have had little impact on the free
movement of shipping and seaborne trade in comparison with the massive
costs of implementing the new counter-measures.
So far the approach to countering the threat of maritime terrorism has been
a generalised one with all ships and ports being required to meet new
international standards. It has also been a defensive one based on a
“guards, guns and gates” approach that is not designed to get industry or
community support, or to get at the root causes of terrorism. Recent
counter-measures to the threat of maritime terrorism have imposed major
41
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additional costs on ship-owners, ports and shippers.
imposing delays on port operations and slowing down the process of
39
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international trade.42 Ports have introduced significant extra charges to
cover the costs of additional security; insurance companies have increased
security premiums; and providers of security services and equipment are
doing good business. In some ways, a displacement of goals has occurred.
While the stated objective of the new measures is to protect the maritime
transportation system, ships and ports from being used for terrorist
purposes, the real benefits have been in terms of enhanced cargo security,
reduced illegal use of shipping containers and customs fraud.
The new focus on maritime security has led to an environment of increased
naval and military spending, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. When
developing countries in the region should be pursuing programmes that
would drive down poverty and social unrest and thus remove root causes of
piracy and terrorism, they are being pressed to increase their defence
spending to provide greater security in their adjacent waters. While the US
sees this greater security as part of the GWOT, the target countries are
increasing their defence spending for more conventional reasons and
against more traditional threats. These militarized and security-based
approaches have high opportunity costs and could well have serious
adverse consequences in the future.
It is time now for a reality check and to consider the broader maritime
strategic and security environment rather than remaining fixated on the
threat of maritime terrorism. Problems such as the root causes of piracy and
terrorism and the ready availability of small arms around the world must be
addressed. There must also be some limit to the current booming levels of
43
naval arms spending in the region. This spending diverts resources from
measures to address poverty and promote economic development.
Meanwhile, the international community seems to be giving lower priority
and fewer resources to measures to protect and preserve the marine
environment and to conserve its biodiversity, despite the established
44
importance of the health of the oceans to the future of the world.
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